Thursday, 2 June 2011
Co-operation And Retaliation
Tit for tat is a highly effective strategy in game theory for the iterated prisoner's dilemma. It was first introduced by Anatol Rapoport in Robert Axelrod's two tournaments, held around 1980. An agent using this strategy will initially cooperate, then respond in kind to an opponent's previous action. Unless provoked, the agent will always cooperate. If provoked, the agent will retaliate. Some game theorists informally believe the strategy to be optimal, although no proof is presented.
A Fool
What has infused my very blood with an unconquerable hatred of the whole tribe of fools from the day of my birth is that I become a fool myself whenever I am in their company.
— Casanova
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